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ABSTRACT
Researchers have hypothesized that failures of inhibition are partially responsible for
habitual and perseverative symptoms that are unique to Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD).
It is also well known that sequelae of emotional processes are also implicated in the etiology and
maintenance of obsessions and compulsions. However, little research has tested how emotional
processes moderate inhibitory functions in OCD. In the present study, high contamination phobic
(HCP, n = 17) and low contamination phobic (LCP, n = 30) participants completed an emotional
go/no-go task, which measured the interfering effects contamination-threat processing on action
restraint. The present study had a two level between-subjects-quasi-independent factor (Group:
LCP vs. HCP), and a two level within-subjects-experimental-factor (Threat: Contamination vs.
Neutral). The proportion of errors of commission (failures of action restraint) was the primary
dependent variable. There were three predictions: 1) for the main effect of Threat, it was
predicted that the visual processing of contamination images would significantly interfere with
action restraint (Contamination errors of commission > Neutral errors of commission); 2) for the
main effect of Group, it was predicted that HCP participants would show poorer action restraint
when compared to LCP participants (HCP errors of commission > LCP errors of commission);
3) for the Group x Threat interaction, it was predicted that the visual processing of contamination
images would interfere more with action restraint among HCP than LCP participants
(Contamination errors of commission among HCP participants > Neutral errors of commission
among HCP participants, Neutral errors of commission among LCP participants, and
Contamination errors of commission among LCP participants). Predictions 1 and 3 were
supported by results while results failed to support the second prediction. These data suggest that
the processing of emotionally arousing imagery interferes with action restraint and the magnitude

of this effect is greater among an analogue OCD sample reporting contamination symptoms.
These findings are clinically relevant and significantly extend etiological models of OCD by
integrating basic neurocognitive and affective mechanisms. The unique and complimentary roles
of emotional, attentional, and inhibitory processes in the etiology and maintenance of obsessions
and compulsions are explored and updates to models of OCD are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Obsessive-compulsive disorder
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a chronic and intractable condition
characterized by severe obsessions and/or compulsions that cause an individual significant
impairment (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Steketee, Eisen, Dyck, Warshaw, &
Rasmussen, 1999). Once thought to be relatively rare, recent research has estimated the lifetime
prevalence of OCD to be between 1% and 3.3% (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005).
According to some estimates, this would make OCD the second most common anxiety disorder
and the fourth most common psychiatric illness (Karno, Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988;
Kessler et al., 2005). The most commonly accepted operational definition of OCD is provided by
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000 (APA), pp. 462-463]. According to the DSM-IV-TR, an individual can meet
diagnostic criteria for OCD if the following five criteria (items A-E) are satisfied:
A. Either obsessions or compulsions:
Obsessions as defined by (1), (2), (3), and (4):
(1) recurrent and persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are
experienced at some time during the disturbance as intrusive and
inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or distress
(2) the thoughts, impulses, or images are not simply excessive
worries about real-life problems
(3) the person attempts to ignore or suppress such thoughts,
impulses, or images, or to neutralize them with some other thought
or action
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(4) the person recognizes that the obsessional thoughts, impulses,
or images are a product of his or her own mind (not imposed from
without as in thought insertion)
Compulsions as defined by (1) and (2):
(1) repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking)
or mental acts (e.g., praying, counting, repeating words silently)
that the person feels driven to perform in response to an obsession,
or according to rules that must be applied rigidly
(2) the behaviors or mental acts are aimed at preventing or
reducing distress or preventing some dreaded event or situation;
however, these behaviors or mental acts either are not connected
in a realistic way with what they are designed to neutralize or
prevent or are clearly excessive
B. At some point during the course of the disorder, the person has recognized that
the obsessions or compulsions are excessive or unreasonable. Note: This does not
apply to children.
C. The obsessions or compulsions cause marked distress, are time consuming
(take more than 1 hour a day), or significantly interfere with the person’s normal
routine, occupational (or academic) functioning, or usual social activities or
relationships.
D. If another Axis I disorder is present, the content of the obsessions or
compulsions is not restricted to it (e.g., preoccupation with food in the presence of
an Eating Disorder; hair pulling in the presence of Trichotillomania; concern
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with appearance in the presence of Body Dysmorphic Disorder; preoccupation
with drugs in the presence of a Substance Use Disorder; preoccupation with
having a serious illness in the presence of Hypochondriasis; preoccupation with
sexual urges or fantasies in the presence of a Paraphilia; or guilty ruminations in
the presence of Major Depressive Disorder).
E. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance
(e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition.
B. Subtypes and Dimensions in OCD
The quality of obsessions and compulsions can span the range of human experience, but
they tend to cluster within reliable factor dimensions (Bloch, Landeros-Weisenberger, Rosario,
Pittenger, & Leckman, 2008; McKay et al., 2004). Although the number of dimensions varies
within the published literature, recent qualitative analyses of the adult Yale-Brown ObsessiveCompulsive Symptoms Checklist [Y-BOCS; (Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, & Mazure, 1989)]
suggested that there are four reliable factor dimensions of obsessions and compulsions among
adults diagnosed with OCD (Bloch et al., 2008, pp. 1532)
1) “Symmetry”; symmetry obsessions and repeating, ordering, and counting
compulsions; 2) “Forbidden Thoughts”; aggression, sexual, religious, and somatic
obsessions and checking compulsions; 3) “Cleaning”; cleaning and contamination
obsessions and compulsions; and 4) “Hoarding”; hoarding obsessions and compulsions.
In general, the findings from the meta-analyses of Bloch and colleagues (2004) were
consistent with a majority of studies that attempted to create factors based on symptoms. There
are two important limitations to much of this research (McKay et al., 2004). First, most factoranalytic studies on obsessions and compulsions neglected the “others” categories of the Y-BOCS
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symptom checklist, which contains a number of symptoms that are common among those
diagnosed with OCD, particularly mental compulsions. Second, factor analyses are used to create
latent dimensions which do not assign cases to a particular subgroup (e.g., washers vs. checkers).
These limitations have has been addressed with cluster analyses (Abramowitz, Franklin,
Schwartz, & Furr, 2003; Calamari, Wiegartz, & Janeck, 1999; Calamari et al., 2004).
A cluster analysis of the Y-BOCS symptom checklist, excluding the “other” symptoms, found
five clusters that closely paralleled the factors reported by Bloch and colleagues, including:
harming, hoarding, contamination, certainty, and obsessionals (Calamari et al., 1999). In a
replication study that included “other” symptoms from the Y-BOCS symptom checklist,
Calamari and colleagues (2004) found seven clusters, including: contamination, harming,
hoarding, obsessionals, symmetry, certainty, and contamination/harming. The novel
contamination/harming cluster was mostly characterized by contamination and washing
symptoms in relation to moral or spiritual impurity. Finally, Abramowitz and colleagues (2003)
conducted a cluster analysis using a modified Y-BOCS symptom checklist that appropriately
measured mental rituals. In partial keeping with Calamari and colleagues (2004), Abramowitz
and colleagues (2003) identified five factors, including: harming, contamination, hoarding,
unacceptable thoughts, and symmetry.
C. Emotion in OCD
The most recent edition of the DSM (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) categorized OCD as an
anxiety disorder, which is consistent with over a century of research and theory (Bartz &
Hollander, 2006; Tynes, White, & Steketee, 1990)1. At a fundamental level, cognitive-behavioral
models of the manifestation and maintenance of OCD differ very little from models of other
anxiety disorders (Rachman, 1997; Rachman, 2002; Rachman, 2004; Salkovskis, 1985). Most
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cognitive-behavioral theorists assert that obsessions and compulsions arise and are maintained by
pathological levels of negative affect, unique interpretations of intrusions, classical, and operant
conditioning. Those diagnosed with OCD report higher levels of trait anxiety than non-clinical
samples, but they report lower levels of trait anxiety compared to participants diagnosed other
forms of disordered anxiety (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Kennedy, Schwab,
Morris, & Beldia, 2001). The affective correlates of obsessions and compulsions are not,
however, restricted to fear and anxiety. Research has reliably shown that one of the most
common dimension of obsessions and compulsions (contamination and washing, respectively)
are also motivated by disgust ( Olatunji & McKay, 2007; Olatunji & Sawchuk, 2005). While
most cognitive-behavioral models of the manifestation and maintenance of OCD differ very little
from models of other anxiety disorders, there are a several unique factors that distinguish OCD
from other anxiety disorders. Perhaps most important are differences in neuropsychological
functions and the sequelae of related neurobiological factors (see Cox, 1997; Greisberg &
McKay, 2003; Otto, 1992; and Schultz, Evans, & Wolff, 1999 for reviews).
D. Attention in OCD
Attentional functions are carried out by three distinct subsystems that are separate from
perceptual and motor functions (Posner & Boies, 1971). These subsystems include: 1) the
alerting network (activation of the attentional system); 2) the orienting network (orienting of
attention to a source) and; 3) the executive attentional control network (conflict resolution and
attention inhibition; (Posner & Petersen, 1990). Research has provided direct and indirect
evidence to suggest that the executive attentional control network is impaired among individuals
diagnosed with OCD (Armstrong, Zald, & Olatunji, 2011). This is an important proposition
given that contemporary theoretical accounts of OCD have proposed that impaired inhibition of
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attentional resources fosters symptoms of OCD (Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, &
Sahakian, 2005). Examples of executive attentional control deficits in OCD include impaired
ability to sustain attention (Gambini, Abbruzzese, & Scarone, 1993; Kim, Park, Shin, & Kwon,
2002; Morein-Zamir et al., 2010), over-focused attention to irrelevant stimuli [distractibility;
(Nelson, Early, & Haller, 1993)], and delayed attention disengagement (Cisler & Olatunji, 2010;
Schmidtke, Schorb, Winkelmann, & Hohagen, 1998).
Research has shown that analogue samples and samples of individuals diagnosed with
OCD evidence attentional biases toward affectively arousing information, particularly symptom
specific information (Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer, & Murdock, 1993; Foa & McNally, 1986;
Lavy, Van Oppen, & Van Den Hout, 1994; Tata, Leibowitz, Prunty, Cameron, & Pickering,
1996). More specifically, recent research suggests that attentional biases in OCD are likely due
to prolonged maintenance of attention on and/or difficulty disengaging attention from
emotionally arousing stimuli, as evidenced by: 1) maintenance of attention toward symptom
specific pictorial stimuli (Armstrong, Sarawgi, & Olatunji, 2012); 2) difficulty disengaging
attention from symptom specific pictorial stimuli (Cisler & Olatunji, 2010); 3) prolonged
maintenance of attention toward highly-arousing/negatively-valenced pictorial stimuli that are
not symptom specific [e.g., fearful faces (Armstrong, Olatunji, Sarawgi, & Simmons, 2010)]; 4)
difficulty disengaging attention from highly-arousing/negatively-valenced pictorial stimuli that
are not symptom specific (Cisler & Olatunji, 2010); and more recently, 5) difficulty disengaging
attention from highly-arousing/positively-valenced pictorial stimuli (i.e., erotica) that are not
symptom specific (Olatunji, Ciesielski, & Zald, 2011).
It should be noted that the evidence for any form of attentional bias in OCD is
controversial and notoriously difficult to replicate across laboratories, assessment paradigms, or
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samples (Summerfeldt & Endler, 1998). There are several theoretical explanations for this
unreliability. The most common explanation hinges on the heterogeneity of OCD, with greater
evidence of attentional biases among participants who report primary symptoms of
contamination obsessions and washing compulsions relative to all other symptom subtypes [e.g.,
primary checking or symmetry types (Summerfeldt & Endler, 1998)]. There is also evidence that
detection of attentional biases in OCD may be dependent on the procedures used. For example,
task complexity, stimulus presentation times, stimulus types, and latency between affective
distractor offset and target onset can significantly affect results (Cisler & Olatunji, 2010; Kyrios
& Iob, 1998; Moritz, Wendt, Jelinek, Ruhe, & Arzola, 2008). Also, one study has shown that
attentional biases in OCD may attenuate over the course of experimental trials and blocks (Amir,
Najmi, & Morrison, 2009). Therefore, researchers may be more likely to detect attentional biases
when using briefer assessment tools or, similarly, biases may be more evident within earlier
assessment blocks than later blocks.
E. Inhibition in OCD
A vast majority of theoretical and empirical literatures suggest that failures of inhibition
may underlie the etiology and expression of OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2007; Fineberg et al.,
2009; Graybiel & Rauch, 2000; Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010; Schultz, Evans, & Wolff, 1999). For
the present manuscript, the term inhibition is constrained to refer to forms of intentional
executive control (Aron, 2007). Executive inhibition is not a unitary construct (Friedman &
Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000). Nigg (2000, p. 237) proposed that the higher order construct of
executive inhibition be split into four separate components, including (words in italics added for
clarity): “1) Interference control: prevent interference due to resource or stimulus competition; 2)
Cognitive inhibition: suppress nonpertinent ideation to protect working memory/attention; 3)
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Behavioral (response) inhibition: suppress prepotent [automatic/prepared/cued] response; and 4)
Oculomotor (inhibition): suppress reflexive saccade.”
Friedman and Miyake (2004) provided convincing data that simplified and challenged
Nigg’s heuristic. In keeping with previous literature, Friedman and Miyake abandoned the
construct of cognitive inhibition as it lacks basic psychometric reliability and validity. This is in
keeping with MacLeod and colleague’s (2003; 2007) criticisms of cognitive inhibition. Namely,
there is simply insufficient evidence to support the proposition that negative priming and
directed forgetting tasks – the two tests most often associated with cognitive inhibition – are
actually dependent on any inhibitory processes (MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003;
MacLeod, 2007). Miyake and Friedman also proposed two components of interference inhibition
(referred to herein as resistance to interference2): 1) resistance to distractor interference (“ability
to resist or resolve interference from information in the external environment that is irrelevant to
the task at hand”); and 2) resistance to proactive interference (“ability to resist memory
intrusions from information that was previously relevant to the task but has since become
irrelevant”) (pp. 104-105). It is worth noting that Friedman and Miyake’s resistance to proactive
inhibition is akin to Nigg’s cognitive inhibition. Finally, Friedman and Miyake provided data to
support the merging of Nigg’s oculomotor and response inhibition into what they described as
prepotent response inhibition.
More recent research has shown that there are even multiple forms of response inhibition
(Aron, 2007; Eagle, Bari, & Robbins, 2008; Schachar et al., 2007). Instead of Nigg’s behavioral
and oculomotor inhibition, recent data suggest that response inhibition can be separated by the
temporal relations between the initiation and suppression of actions. As such, response inhibition
can be separated into two factors, action restraint (i.e., inhibition before initiation) and action
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cancellation (i.e., inhibition following initiation) (Aron, 2007; Eagle, Bari, & Robbins, 2008;
Schachar et al., 2007). In summary, a modern conceptualization of executive inhibition would
likely include two higher-order executive inhibitory factors, each with two lower order factors
that are unique in their temporal qualities (see Figure 2).
It has been hypothesized that deficits in resistance to interference (often coined
“cognitive inhibition”) may partially account for the ease with which obsessions can enter into
and take over the consciousness of those diagnosed with OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2005).
Experimental and neurobiological research have shown that the classic Stroop effect [difficulty
naming ink color of printed words [e.g., “blue”] that are written in incongruent colored ink
(Stroop, 1935)] is a measure of resistance to interference and prepotent response inhibition
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Vendrell et al., 1995). Several studies have shown that adults
diagnosed with OCD evidence greater Stroop interference when compared to a healthy control
sample (Hartston & Swerdlow, 1999; Martinot et al., 1990; Penades et al., 2007). This effect not
only remained but appeared to be larger when samples diagnosed with OCD were compared to
samples diagnosed with panic disorder (Bannon, Gonsalvez, Croft, & Boyce, 2002; 2006;
Bannon, Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008). One study that failed to detect significant differences in
Stroop interference among a sample diagnosed with OCD, nevertheless did report abnormal
patterns of neural activation during the Stroop procedures [e.g., anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
and right caudate nucleus hypoactivity (Nakao et al., 2005)]. This is an important finding as the
ACC is believed to be largely responsible for error monitoring, resistance to interference, and the
processing of affective information, all of which have clear implications for obsessions and
compulsions (Bush et al., 1998; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Saxena, O'Neill, & Rauch, 2009;
Whalen et al., 1998).
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There is strong evidence that individuals diagnosed with OCD perform more poorly on
tests designed to measure response inhibition than healthy controls and anxious controls. Two
early studies by Rosenberg and colleagues (Rosenberg, Dick, O'Hearn, & Sweeney, 1997;
Rosenberg et al., 1997) showed that OCD-diagnosed children performed more poorly than
healthy controls on a task that requires simple inhibition of eye movements (antisaccade). This
finding has been supported by more recent research with adult samples (Lennertz et al., 2012).
Similarly, a recent meta-analysis (Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010) found that, collapsed across 4
studies, individuals diagnosed with OCD performed more poorly on the stop-signal task – a
measure of action cancellation – than healthy controls, and the magnitude of this effect was
medium-large and reliable (g = .77, p < .01). Moreover, this same meta-analysis found no
reliable differences in stop-signal performance between healthy controls and those diagnosed
with an anxiety disorder other than OCD (g = .09).
A host of research has also shown that participants diagnosed with OCD perform more poorly on
the go/no-go task – a measure of action restraint (go/no-go errors of commission) – when
compared to healthy controls and anxious controls (Aycicegi, Dinn, Harris, & Erkmen, 2003;
Bannon, Gonsalvez, Croft, & Boyce, 2002; 2006; Penades et al., 2007; Watkins et al., 2005).
Two studies failed to detect differences in action restraint between healthy controls and
participants diagnosed with OCD (Bohne, Savage, Deckersbach, Keuthen, & Wilhelm, 2008;
Herrmann, Jacob, Unterecker, & Fallgatter, 2003).
There is convincing evidence that deficits in response inhibition in OCD are trait-like and
heritable (Bannon et al., 2006; Lennertz et al., 2012; Menzies et al., 2007). This has led several
theorists to propose that deficient response inhibition may serve as a developmental
endophenotype of OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2008; Chamberlain & Menzies, 2009; Chamberlain
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et al., 2005; Fineberg et al., 2009; Menzies et al., 2008; Rosenberg & Keshavan, 1998; Taylor,
2012). Two studies have shown that unaffected (symptom free) first-degree relatives of
participants diagnosed with OCD performed more poorly on tests of response inhibition when
compared to healthy controls (Lennertz et al., 2012; Menzies et al., 2007). Neither study detected
significant differences in response inhibition between participants diagnosed with OCD and their
first-degree relatives. These findings and the inhibitory endophenotype theory of OCD are
consistent with genetic research which has shown that individual differences in response
inhibition abilities (as measured by a latent combination of the Stroop, stop-signal, and
antisaccade tasks) are approximately 99% heritable (Friedman et al., 2008)].
F. Emotion and Inhibition
Research has shown that emotions and executive inhibitory functions play an important
role in OCD. However, very little published research has attempted to integrate affective and
inhibitory processes to further the understanding of OCD. A limited body of research has also
shown that, among obsessive-compulsive (OC) samples, the processing of emotionally arousing
stimuli interferes with resistance to interference3. As noted by Morein-Zamir and colleagues
(2010), findings have been inconsistent across studies that have tested affective interference of
inhibitory processes in OCD. Inconsistent findings may be an artifact of task complexity
(Bannon et al., 2008; Morein-Zamir et al., 2010) or the use of interference stimuli that are
difficult to process rapidly and may be nominally arousing [i.e., emotional words (Bannon et al.,
2008; Tolin, Hamlin, & Foa, 2002; Wilhelm, McNally, Baer, & Florin, 1996). Moreover, all but
one (Bannon et al., 2008) of the aforementioned studies attempted to assesses cognitive
inhibition with directed forgetting and negative priming paradigms, which may be tasks of
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limited validity (MacLeod, 2007). As noted by Krikorian and colleagues (2004), no study has
directly tested how affective factors might interfere with response inhibition in OCD.
A recent publication by Morein-Zamir and colleagues (2013) showed that adults
diagnosed with OCD performed more poorly than healthy controls on a go/no-go task that
incorporated punitive feedback. An increase in commission errors following punishment was
also highly correlated with self-reported symptom severity. Although not a direct test of affective
interference, this study suggests that arousal (in anticipation of punishment) may cause greater
response inhibition interference among those diagnosed with OCD than healthy controls. This
interpretation is consistent with several studies that used non-selected samples to test how
affective factors interfere with response inhibition. In a rather ingenious study, Pessoa and
colleagues (2012) first conditioned participants to fear one auditory stimulus (e.g., “one”) and
not the other (e.g., “two”) by pairing one stimulus (CS+) with shock and not the other (CS-).
Participants then completed a stop-signal task that utilized both auditory stimuli as the stopsignal. Pessoa and colleagues were then able to test the specific effects of early threat activation
on action cancellation. Consistent with their hypotheses, they found that action cancellation was
poorer on threat stop-signal trials (CS+) than no-threat stop-signal trials (CS-). Moreover, this
effect was largely explained by physiological indices of affective arousal following the CS+
stop-signal (galvanic skin conductance).
Several studies have also investigated how the processing of emotional stimuli interferes
with response inhibition (De Houwer & Tibboel, 2010; Pessoa et al., 2012; Verbruggen & De
Houwer, 2007). Separate from the previously mentioned study, Pessoa and colleagues (2012)
used emotional faces (happy, fearful, and neutral) as visual stop signals. Counter to their
hypotheses, they found that the emotional faces facilitated action cancellation and this effect was
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invariant across face valence. Verbruggen and DeHouwer (2007) showed that the 250 ms
presentation of emotionally-arousing pictures immediately prior to target stimuli in a classic
stop-signal paradigm resulted in delays in action cancellation. Although Verbruggen and
DeHouwer found that pictures that were high in emotional arousal caused delays in action
cancellation, they did not detect a significant effect of valence. Similarly, De Houwer and
Tibboel (2010) presented emotional pictorial stimuli for 250 ms prior to target and no-go stimuli
during a classic go/no-go task. Pictures that were high in emotional arousal interfered with no-go
trials (more errors of commission) and delayed go trials. De Houwer and Tibboel reported almost
identical interference effects among high arousing pictures that were positively valenced (e.g.,
nude model) and high arousing pictures that were negatively valenced (e.g., mutilated hand).
Taken as a whole, these studies show that the processing of emotional information can modulate
response inhibition, but timing and arousal play important roles in the direction of influence.
Accoding to De Houwer and Tibboel (2010), there were two competing hypotheses that
might explain the interfering effects of emotion on response inhibition and base reaction time
(i.e., go-signal trials): 1) the freezing account, and 2) the attentional account. According to the
freezing account, emotionally arousing stimuli can cause brief and incomplete tonic immobility,
which in should slow prepotent responses and thus increase the probability of an action being
inhibited. According to the attentional account, emotionally arousing stimuli capture and hold
attention. Given that attention is required for response inhibition, the decrease in attentional
resources caused by the processing of emotional information results in a diminished capacity to
exercise motor control (e.g., delayed response inhibition). If the freezing account were accurate,
then participants would have evidenced slower go-signal reaction times but fewer rates of
commission errors on arousing relative to non-arousing trials. If the attentional account were
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accurate, then participants would have evidenced faster go-signal reaction times and higher rates
of commission errors on arousing relative to non-arousing trials. Attention is a limited resource
(Huang & Pashler, 2005; Kane & Engle, 2002) and emotionally arousing information captures
and holds attention more so than emotionally neutral or personally irrelevant information (Fox,
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Koster,
Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005). This attentional capture affects other cognitive
processes that are also dependent on attentional resources. Response inhibition procedures, and
particularly, the go/no-go paradigm, require attentional resources. When stimuli capture, hold,
and residually affect attention, then response inhibition should be impaired (Verbruggen &
Logan, 2008b). This is precisely what was found by De Houwer and Tibboel (2010) and
Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007). As such, the most tenable interpretation of the findings
reported by Verbruggen and colleagues and De Houwer and Tibboel is that emotionally arousing
information interfered with response inhibition via attention. Said otherwise, attention was the
mediating mechanism between emotional processing and response inhibition.
G. Present Study
If the attentional account of emotional interference of response inhibition is correct, then
interfering effects of emotionally arousing stimuli on response inhibition should be greater
among populations with attentional biases toward emotionally arousing information. Participants
diagnosed with OCD and analogue obsessive-compulsive (OC) samples have reliably shown
biases toward emotionally arousing information, particularly disorder relevant information.
Therefore, the interfering effects of disorder relevant stimuli on response inhibition should be
intensified among participants diagnosed with OCD and those reporting elevated OC symptoms.
This is particularly germane to OCD as clinical examples of failed response inhibition occur
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during moments that are brimming with emotional information. Take, for example, compulsive
hand washing. Compulsive hand washing, as opposed to non-pathological hand washing, can be
explained by a strong motivation to wash and a failure to stop washing (i.e., failures of
inhibition). The internal and contextual features that motivate washing are emotional in nature
(e.g., disgust and anxiety) and can, therefore, be assumed to potentially interfere with inhibition.
The present study addresses critical gaps in the extant literature by testing affective
interference of action restraint in OCD. The proposed study utilized two participant groups, high
contamination phobic (HCP) and low contamination phobic (LCP). All participants will
complete a symptom-specific version of the emotional go/no-go task (DeHouwer & Tibboel,
2010), which was designed to test the interfering effects of contamination-threat stimuli on
action restraint. The primary dependent variable of the go/no-go task is proportion of errors of
commission (going when required to restrain action). The contamination-threat go/no-go has one
within-subjects main effect with two levels [Threat (contamination vs. neutral)]. The present
study will, therefore, utilize a 2 (Group: HCP vs. LCP) x 2 (Threat: contamination vs. neutral]
factorial design with errors of commission as the primary dependent variable. Additional
dependent variables will also be analyzed for exploratory purposes, including errors of omission
(not going on go trials), no-go RT [NGRT (latency of key press on no-go trials)], and go RT
[GRT (latency of key press on go trials)]; each of which will be analyzed at both levels of the
within subjects factor.
II. STUDY HYPOTHESES
1) For the main effect of Threat:
Ho: The visual processing of contamination imagery will not interfere with action
restraint (Contamination- Errors of Commission = Neutral- Errors of Commission)
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H1: The visual processing of contamination imagery will interfere with action
restraint (Contamination- Errors of Commission > Neutral- Errors of Commission)
2) For the main effect of Group:
Ho: Collapsed across both levels of threat, HCP participants will show no
difference in action restraint when compared to LCP participants (Errors of
Commission among HCP participants = Errors of Commission among LCP participants)
H1: Collapsed across both levels of threat, HCP participants will show poorer action
restraint when compared to LCP participants (Errors of Commission among HCP
participants > Errors of Commission among LCP participants)
3) For the Group x Threat interaction:
Ho: The visual processing of contamination imagery will not differentially interfere with
action restraint among HCP and LCP participants (Contamination errors of commission
among HCP participants = Neutral errors of commission among HCP participants,
Neutral errors of commission among LCP participants, and Contamination errors of
commission among LCP participants).
H1: The visual processing of contamination imagery will interfere with action
restraint more among HCP than LCP participants (Contamination errors of commission
among HCP participants > Neutral errors of commission among HCP participants,
Neutral errors of commission among LCP participants, and Contamination errors of
commission among LCP participants).
III. METHODS
A. Materials
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1. Affective Interference Stimuli. De Houwer and Tibboel (2010) used pictorial
interference stimuli in their emotional go/no-go task. Furthermore, affective pictorial stimuli are
processed more rapidly (Gläscher & Adolphs, 2003), achieve greater amygdala activation
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Markowitsch, 1998) and are exert a greater effect on attention
(Moritz et al., 2008) than words. Therefore, pictorial stimuli, rather than words, were considered
more appropriate interference stimuli for the emotional go-no/go task.
The contamination and neutral pictures from Armstrong and colleagues (2012) were
utilized as interference stimuli for the present study. These are 24 pictures (12 contamination, 12
neutral), most of which were selected from the International Affective Picture Set (IAPS) (Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) and several of which were found on the internet. Armstrong and
colleagues validated this picture set and showed that the contamination pictures were rated as
more unpleasant, arousing, fearful, and disgusting than the neutral picture set. Six separate
affectively neutral (low arousal, neutral valence) images were selected from the IAPS to be used
in practice trials. All pictures were 12cm wide x 11 cm high.
2. Emotional Go/No-Go (Figure 3). The emotional go/no-go in the present study was
identical to that used by De Houwer and Tibboel (2010) except different pictures and emotion
categories were used in the present study. Participants first received written instructions
comparable to those outlined by De Houwer and Tibboel. The experimenter also described the
procedures in a casual fashion to the participant and questions were answered prior to beginning
practice blocks. In brief, participants were instructed that they would be completing a series of
test trials that would begin with the presentation of a picture followed by either a go symbol or
no-go symbol. They were told that their task was to press the spacebar as fast as possible every
time they saw the go-symbol and to do nothing when they saw no-go symbol. They were also
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told that speed was very important on go-trials and, because of this, some errors were okay as
long as they were doing their best to go as fast as they could while still doing their best to resist
pushing the spacebar following the presentation of the no-go target.
Practice and test trials started with the presentation of a 12cm x 11cm white rectangle in
the center of the screen. After 500 ms, one of the IAPS pictures appeared in the center of the
square for 250 ms. A go symbol (character A) or no-go symbol (character B) then appeared in
the middle of the screen until the participant responded or until 400 ms elapsed. When
participants took longer than 400 ms to respond on go trials, the software recorded a reaction
time of 400ms. Characters A and B were either § or #, counterbalanced as go or no-go symbols
across participants. If the participant did not respond within 400 ms on go trials, then “TOO
SLOW” appeared on the screen for 200 ms. Each new trial began 600 ms after a response or
feedback.
The emotional go/no-go began with a block of 24 practice trials in which neutral IAPS
pictures were followed by the go symbol 12 times and the no-go symbol 12 times. If a participant
received more than 6 “TOO SLOW” warning messages during practice, then the experimenter
had the participant complete another practice block. This was done to stress the importance of
speed to participants who appeared to strategically slow their responding to prevent errors of
commission. No participant was required to complete more than 2 practice blocks. Participants
then completed 2 test blocks, each starting with 6 warm-up trials followed by 96 test trials. The
warm-up trials were randomly drawn from the practice block. During the test trials, each of the
24 test-trial pictures was presented 8 times and was followed by the go symbol the no-go symbol
and equal number of times. This resulted in 24 neutral go, 24 neutral no-go, 24 contamination go,
and 24 contamination no-go trials per block. As such, each participant completed a total of 192

18

test trials (48 test trials per trial type). The order of test trials was determined randomly within
each test block for each participant. The primary dependent variable, errors of commission, was
measured via proportion of response errors (commission) relative to total no-go trials. Secondary
variables included errors of omission (proportion of response errors on go trials), go RT (GRT;
average RT on go trials), and no-go RT (NGRT; average RT on no-go trials). All 4 of the
emotional go/no-go variables were calculated across each of the two threat categories
(contamination vs. neutral) for a total of eight measurement variables.
3. Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Appendix A) (Abramowitz et al.,
2010) is a 20-item, self-report measure that assesses severity of four symptom dimensions of
OCD [5-items each: contamination (DOCS-C), responsibility (DOCS-R), unacceptable thoughts
(DOCS-O), and symmetry (DOCS-S)]. The DOCS uses a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from
0 to 4. The total score of the DOCS ranges from zero to 80 and the subscale scores each range
from 0 to 20. A DOCS-Total cut-off score of 18 has strong sensitivity (78%) and specificity
(78%) when used to differentiate between individuals diagnosed with OCD and nonclinical
adults (Abramowitz et al., 2010). The DOCS is a valid and reliable measure of OC symptoms,
with previous research reporting Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranging from .83 to .96 for each
of the subscale scores. Cronbach’s alpha was high for the DOCS-Total score (α = .96) and
moderate to high for all DOCS subscales (αcontamination = .91, αresponsibility = .92, αobsessions = .87,
αsymmetry = .93) within the present sample.
4. Generalized Anxiety Disorder – 7 (GAD-7; Appendix B) (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams,
& Lowe, 2006) is a 7-item, self-report measure of anxiety. While originally designed to assess
the severity of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), the GAD-7 can also be used to assess
levels of trait anxiety and can be useful in discriminating between individuals diagnosed with an
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anxiety disorder [i.e., GAD, Panic Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder, and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD)] and those with no anxiety disorder (Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, Monahan, &
Lo we, 2007). The GAD-7 uses a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 ‘not at all’ to 3
‘nearly every day’ to assess symptoms of anxiety (e.g., “Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge”)
over the last 2 weeks. The GAD-7 total score ranges from zero to 21. A GAD-7 cut-off score of
8 has strong sensitivity (77%) and specificity (82%) when used to differentiate between adults
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and those with no anxiety disorder diagnosis (Kroenke et al.,
2007). Lo we and colleagues (2008) have shown that the GAD-7 is a valid and reliable measure
of symptoms of anxiety, with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .89. Cronbach’s alpha was
moderate, α = .81, within the present sample.
B. Participants
Inclusion in the HCP group required DOCS-C and DOCS-Total scores greater than or
equal to 7 and 18, respectively, during laboratory assessment. Inclusion in the LCP group
required DOCS-C and DOCS-Total scores less than or equal to 3 and less than 18, respectively,
during laboratory assessment. Abramowitz and colleagues (2010) reported a mean DOCS-C
score of 6.53 (SD = 6.4) among a large sample diagnosed with OCD and a mean DOCS-C score
of 3.07 (SD = 2.76) and 2.03 (SD = 2.89) among samples diagnosed with other anxiety disorders
and student samples, respectively. As such, the selected cut-off scores ensured that HCP
participants had clinically significant symptoms of OCD, particularly contamination obsessions
and washing compulsions, while also ensuring that these symptoms were minimal among LCP
participants.
Seven hundred eighty six participants completed the DOCS-C scale during a mass
screening of Introductory Psychology students at a large southern university. Only the DOCS-C
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subscale was administered due to page and cost restrictions during screening procedures.
Participants who scored ≥ 7 or ≤ 3 on the DOCS-C were contacted by the primary author to
schedule a testing session, which resulted in the scheduling of 86 participants. From those
scheduled, 18 HCP and 31 LCP participants scored above or below their respective DOCS-C and
DOCS-Total cut-off scores during the testing session. Two participants (one from each group)
were not included in the final analyses due to problematic data (see Data Preparation). As such,
the final sample size was 47.
A majority of participants were female (63.8%) and Caucasian (83%). The average age of
participants was 19.28 years (SD = 1.58, range = 18-28). HCP and LCP groups did not
significantly differ in age, gender, or race, all ps > .10, (Table 1). Only two participants reported
that they were taking psychotropic medication at the time of the experiment. One participant in
the LCP group reported that she was prescribed Adderall and one participant in the HCP group
reported that she was prescribed Prozac. HCP participants scored higher than LCP participants
on all DOCS subscales and the GAD-7, all ps < .01 (Table 1). All participants were offered and
provided either class credit toward a course requirement or $20 cash as compensation for their
participation in the present study. A sizeable majority of participants (91.5%) received class
credit.
C. Procedures
All participants were tested individually in a dark 6x8 room. All procedures were
completed on a Dell Optiplex 745 PC with an Intel Duo Core processor. Pictorial stimuli were
presented on a 36cm by 29cm flat screen Dell monitor set at a 1280x1024 resolution and 60 hz
refresh rate. All participants were seated approximately 18cm from the screen. The emotional
go/no-go task was programmed and administered using Inquisit software (version 3.0.6.0,
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Milliscond Software) and participant responses were registered via a standard USB keyboard.
Each experimental session began with the completion of an IRB approved informed consent.
Participants then completed the emotional go/no-go task followed by a questionnaire battery. All
participants were then fully debriefed and offered appropriate referral information.
IV. RESULTS
A. Data Analytic Approach
Multilevel modeling (MLM) – also known as hierarchical linear modeling or mixed
modeling – was utilized to test all hypotheses and most secondary analyses4. MLM was chosen
due to unequal sample sizes between groups and the fact that observations across the within
subjects factor were not independent, both of which would have violated major assumptions of
mixed factor ANOVA but are not required for MLM (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2008). Moreover,
MLM improves reliability of parameter estimates and, thus, improves Type I errors rates when
compared to mixed factor ANOVA.
Models were specified in an iterative, additive fashion, whereby fixed and random factors
were added to the baseline (null) model one by one to ensure that the final model evidenced
greater goodness of fit relative to the baseline model. For each hypothesis test, models were
specified and compared in the following order: 1) baseline model; 2) level 1 (Threat), 3) level 2
(Threat and Group), and 4) full model (Threat, Group, and Threat by Group) (Field & Wright,
2011; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2008). Despite small sample sizes, full maximum likelihood (ML) –
as opposed to restricted maximum likelihood (REML) – was used to calculate parameter
estimates. This was largely to allow for comparisons between non-nested models. The default
covariance structures of the repeated effect (diagonal covariance) were utilized for all analyses as
the repeated measurement (Threat) only had two levels, which were not heterogeneous and the
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random effects (intercept and subjects) only had one level. Type III sum of squares were used to
test all omnibus fixed effects. Finally, correlational and hierarchical regression analyses were
used for exploratory analyses aimed at testing mechanisms of action. All analyses were carried
out with SPSS 20 (IBM Corp.). The SPSS syntax and data matrix can be found in Appendices C
and D, respectively.
B. Data Preparation and Assumption Testing
Missing values analyses revealed that less than 1% of data were missing from both the
DOCS and GAD-7. Little’s missing completely at random (MCAR) test was utilized to ensure
that data were MCAR. Results indicated that data were MCAR, Χ2 (26) = 21.10, p = .74. Missing
data were imputed using estimation maximization. No data were missing from the emotional
go/no-go.
To enhance interpretability of parameter estimates, errors of commission and omission
were transformed from decimal percentages to full percentages [e.g., from .21 to 21 (21%)]. Data
from the emotional go/no-go were inspected and cleaned according to the standards outlined by
De Houwer and Tibboel (2010). Reaction times below 150 ms were removed from the data
matrix. This resulted in the removal of 21 trials, less than 1% of all data. As previously
mentioned, two participants were not included in any analyses as their data were indicative of
poor effort or strategic performance. Despite appropriately completing 24 trials of go/no-go
practice, these two participants performed below chance on go trials (i.e., errors of omission >
50%) and, as such, their performance on no-go trials was nearly perfect.
Data from the emotional go/no-go were inspected for normality. Visual inspection of the
data (i.e., histograms and P-P plots) and test statistics suggested that the proportion of neutral
errors of commission was significantly positively skewed (skewness = 1.16, SE = .35), and
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neutral NGRT was significantly negatively skewed (skewness = -1.28, SE = .36) and leptokurtic
(kurtosis = 3.82, SE = .70). When collapsed across the within subjects factor, none of the
emotional go/no-go variables evidenced significant skewness or kurtosis; although NGRT was
still somewhat leptokurtic (kurtosis = 1.38, SE = .50). The severity of skewness of neutral errors
of commission was, therefore, deemed acceptable and errors of commission were analyzed in
their raw form (not transformed). The non-normality of NGRT and particularly neutral-NGRT
was deemed problematic. Given that this variable was only included in secondary analyses and
the fact that there are no empirically supported methods for transforming leptokurtic data, these
data were also analyzed in their raw form. However, interpretations of results from analyses
using NGRT as a DV were treated as less reliable and interpreted more cautiously.
C. Primary Analyses
The first series of MLM models were carried out to test all primary hypotheses (the
effects of Threat and Group on errors of commission). Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and
Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) of the baseline model were 696.59 and 704.22, respectively.
The interclass correlation (ICC) of the baseline model was .41, suggesting adequate variance
within errors of commission. The intercept of the baseline model suggested that, when collapsed
across Threat and Group, participants committed, on average, 13.76% errors of commission (β =
13.76, SE = 1.22). The level 1 model was used to estimate the main effect of the within subjects
variable (Threat). Threat was modeled as a fixed and repeated effect while the intercept was
modeled as a random and fixed effect. AIC of the within subjects model was 679.52 while
Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion BIC was 692.24, suggesting model improvement relative to the
baseline model. The level 2 model was used to estimate the main effects of the within (Threat)
and between (Group) subjects variables. Threat and Group were modeled as fixed effects, Threat
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was modeled as a repeated effect, and the intercept was modeled as a fixed and random effect.
AIC for the within subjects model was 680.32 while BIC was 695.58, suggesting that the
addition of the Group factor did not improve model fit. However, the Group factor was retained
in subsequent models because of the importance of the interaction term to hypotheses tests.
Finally, the full model was identical to the level 2 model, save for the addition of the Threat by
Group interaction as a fixed effect. AIC for the full model was 678.28 and BIC was 696.09.
While BIC suggests a slight increase in model fit relative to the baseline model, it also suggests a
poorer fit relative to the level 1 and level 2 models. Conversely, AIC suggests superior fit
relative to all models with fewer parameter estimates. Given AIC estimates and the fact that BIC
can over penalize when estimating with small samples (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2008), parameter
estimates of the full model are considered reliable.
The main effect of Threat was significant, F (1, 47) = 31.13, p < .01, suggesting that,
when collapsed across Group, participants committed more errors of commission on
contamination no-go trials than neutral no-go trials. The main effect of Group was not significant
F (1, 47) = 1.82, p = .18, suggesting that, when collapsed across Threat, HCP participants did not
commit more errors of commission on no-go trials than LCP participants. Finally, the Threat by
Group interaction effect was significant F (1, 47) = 4.21, p < .05, suggesting that the effects of
Threat were greater for one group relative to the other. The effects of Threat are clearly greater
among HCP compared to LCP participants (Figure 4), a series of probing analyses are
nonetheless outlined below.
SPSS treats the group with the highest value as the reference group. Therefore, for the
first set of contrast analyses, Threat was coded so that neutral trials were the reference group (1 =
Neutral and 0 = Contamination) and Group was coded so that LCP was the reference group (1 =
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LCP and 0 = HCP). This ensured that all estimates of the fixed effect were compared to the
proper reference groups (Neutral, LCP, and Neutral by LCP). The estimate of the fixed effect of
the intercept suggested that, on neutral no-go trials, the proportion of errors of commission
committed by LCP participants was 10.30% (βintercept = 10.30, SE = 1.61). The estimate of the
fixed effect of Threat suggested that LCP participants committed 4.50% more errors of
commission on contamination no-go trials (βthreat = 4.50, SE = 1.53, p < .01, d = 0.86). The
estimate of the fixed effect of Group suggested that LCP participants committed only 0.74%
more errors of commission than HCP participants on neutral no-go trials (βgroup = 0.74, SE =
2.68, p = .78, d = 0.08). Finally, the estimate of the fixed effect of the Threat by Group
interaction term suggested that, compared to the percentage of errors of commission committed
by LCP participants on neutral no-go trials (10.30%), an average of 5.24% more errors of
commission were committed across the other three experimental cells (LCP/Contamination,
HCP/Neutral, HCP/Contamination) (βthreat*group = 5.24, SE = 2.55, p < .05, d = 0.60).
To target the magnitude of the effect of the cell of interest (HCP/Contamination), Threat
was recoded so that contamination trials were the reference group (0 = Neutral and 1 =
Contamination) and Group was recoded so that HCP was the reference group (0 = LCP and 1 =
HCP) and one additional MLM model was carried out. The estimate of the fixed effect of the
intercept suggested that the proportion of errors of commission committed by HCP participants
on contamination no-go trials was 20.78% (βintercept = 20.78, SE = 2.32). The estimate of the fixed
effect of Threat suggested that HCP participants committed 9.74% more errors of commission on
contamination no-go trials (βthreat = 9.73, SE = 2.04, p < .01, d = 1.39). The estimate of the fixed
effect of Group suggested that HCP participants committed 5.98% more errors of commission
than LCP participants on contamination no-go trials (βgroup = 5.98, SE = 2.91, p < .05, d = 0.60).
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Finally, the estimate of the fixed effect of the Threat by Group interaction term suggested that,
compared to the percentage of errors of commission committed by HCP participants on
contamination no-go trials (20.78%), an average of 5.24% fewer errors of commission were
committed across the other three experimental cells (LCP/Contamination, HCP/Neutral,
HCP/Contamination) (βthreat*group = 5.24, SE = 2.55, p < .05, d = 0.60). Descriptive statistics are
summarized in Table 2.
D. Secondary Analyses
The second series of MLM analyses were conducted to test the effects of Threat and
Group on errors of omission. Model building and estimation procedures were identical to the
previously described series of MLMs. AIC and BIC of the baseline model were 700.01 and
707.64, respectively. The ICC of the baseline model was .66, suggesting adequate variance
within errors of omission. The intercept of the baseline model suggested that, when collapsed
across Threat and Group, participants committed, on average, 24.32% errors of omission (β =
24.32, SE = 1.48). AIC of the level 1, or within subjects (Threat), model was 693.70 while BIC
was 706.42, suggesting model improvement relative to the baseline model. AIC of the level 2, or
between subjects (Group), model was 695.39 and BIC was 710.65, suggesting that the addition
of the Group factor did not improve model fit. Finally, AIC for the full model was 697.23 and
BIC was 715.03, suggesting that the addition of the Threat by Group interaction term did not
improve model fit. Inspection of cell means clearly show no effects of Group or interaction
between Threat and Group on errors of omission (Table 3). As a consequence of these analyses,
only the effects from the level 1, or within subjects (Threat), model are reported. The fixed effect
estimate of the intercept of the Threat model suggested that, collapsed across the level of Group,
participants committed an average of 22.36% errors of omission on neutral go trials (β = 22.36,
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SE = 1.52). The fixed effect estimate of Threat suggested that the rate of errors of omission
increased 3.92% on contamination go trials (β = 3.92, SE = 1.22, p < .01, d = 0.93).
The third series of MLM analyses were conducted to test the effects of Threat and Group
on NGRT. Because some participants had 0% errors of commission, they had no NGRT to
include in analyses. Model building and estimation procedures were identical to the previously
described series of MLMs. AIC and BIC of the baseline model were 851.82 and 859.35,
respectively. The ICC of the baseline model was .29, suggesting adequate variance within
NGRT. The intercept of the baseline model suggested that, when collapsed across Threat and
Group, NGRT was 298.14 ms (β = 298.14, SE = 3.06). AIC of the level 1, or within subjects
(Threat), model was 846.88 while BIC was 859.44, suggesting model improvement relative to
the baseline model. AIC of the level 2, or between subjects (Group), model was 848.76 and BIC
was 869.82, suggesting that the addition of the Group factor did not improve model fit. Finally,
AIC for the full model was 848.35 and BIC was 865.92, suggesting that the addition of the
Threat by Group interaction term did not improve model fit relative to the level 1 model.
Inspection of cell means clearly show no effects of Group or interaction between Threat and
Group on NGRT (Table 4). As a result of these findings, only the effects of the level 1, within
subjects (Threat) model are reported. The fixed effect estimate of the intercept of the Threat
model suggested that, collapsed across the level of Group, the average NGRT on neutral no-go
trails was 291.40 ms (β = 291.40, SE = 3.63). The fixed effect estimate of Threat suggested that
the NGRT increased 12.78 ms on contamination no-go trials (β = 12.78, SE = 4.08, p < .01, d =
0.91).
The final series of MLM analyses were conducted to test the effects of Threat and Group
on GRT. Model building and estimation procedures were similar to the previously described
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series of MLMs. AIC and BIC of the baseline model were 745.17 and 752.80, respectively. The
ICC of the baseline model was .64, suggesting adequate variance within GRT. The intercept of
the baseline model suggested that, when collapsed across Threat and Group, GRT was 339.91 ms
(β = 339.91, SE = 1.87). AIC of the level 1, or within subjects (Threat), model was 747.69 and
BIC was 760.41, suggesting that the addition of the Threat factor did not improve model fit
relative to the baseline model. Given this, the level 2, or between subjects (Group), model was
estimated without the Threat factor. The addition of the fixed effect of Group failed to improve
model fit relative to the baseline model (AIC = 746.74, BIC = 756.92). To ensure no effects were
missed, a full model was tested and compared to the baseline model. The full model also failed
to outperform the baseline model (AIC = 750.46, BIC = 768.26). Inspection of cell means clearly
show no main effects or interaction effects (Table 5). None of the estimates of fixed effects are,
therefore, reported or interpreted.
E. Exploratory Analyses
Correlations between each of the dependent variables (errors of commission, errors or
omission, NGRT, and GRT), each of the DOCS subscales, DOCS-Total, and GAD-7 total were
inspected within the entire sample (Table 6) and within each of the quasi-experimental groups
(Table 7). Correlations among the entire sample showed that neutral and contamination errors of
commission were highly correlated (r = .57, p ≤ .01). DOCS-Contamination was only marginally
correlated with the proportion of errors of commission (r = .25, p ≤ .10). None of the other
DOCS subscales and severity of anxiety (GAD-7 Total) correlated with neutral or contamination
errors of commission. The pattern of correlations was considerably different and more
informative when separately inspected within each phobic group.
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Severity of obsessions, compulsions, and anxiety were largely unrelated to any go/no-go
variables among LCP participants. This was likely due to restricted variance in DOCS and GAD7 scores among LCP participants, which was possibly a consequence of sampling. For example,
DOCS-Total and DOCS-C variance were 15.50 and 1.02 among LCP participants and 75.62 and
5.40 among HCP participants. Correlations between go/no-go variables and DOCS scores should
be, therefore, interpreted minimally and cautiously among LCP participants. Among HCP
participants DOCS-C scores were not related to neutral or contamination errors of commission
but were marginally related to neutral errors of omission (r = .44, p = .07), suggesting that the
probability to fail to respond on go-trials increased as severity of contamination-washing
symptoms increased. DOCS-Total was positively correlated with neutral (r = .49, p ≤ .05) and
contamination (r = .59, p ≤ .01) NGRT. This suggests that, as severity of obsessions and
compulsions increased, HCP participants reacted more quickly on no-go trials. Similarly, GRT
increased as severity of obsessions and compulsions increased. This effect was relatively
constant for both neutral GRT (r = .41, p ≤ .10) and contamination GRT (r = .52, p ≤ .05).
Finally, there were weak, negative correlations between DOCS-Total and neutral (r = -.37, p =
.14) and contamination errors of commission (r = -.30, p = .24) among HCP participants. This
suggests that, among HCP participants, action restraint marginally improved (fewer errors of
commission) as severity of OC symptoms increased.
Among HCP participants, there were strong negative relations between errors of
commission and NGRT. As NGRT decreased, the proportion of errors of commission increased
(all rs > -.46, Table 7). More specifically, as contamination NGRT decreased both neutral (r = .53, p ≤ .05) and contamination (r = -.54, p ≤ .05) errors of commission increased. Among HCP
participants, there were also strong negative relations between errors of commission and
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contamination GRT. These relations were not present between neutral GRT and errors of
commission. As contamination GRT decreased, the proportion of errors of commission increased
(all rs > -.46, Table 7). More specifically, as contamination GRT decreased both neutral (r = .71, p ≤ .01) and contamination (r = -.67, p ≤ .01) errors of commission increased.
Threat, Group, the Threat by Group interaction term, errors of omission, GRT, and
NGRT were all simultaneously regressed onto errors of omission (see Table 8 for summary). The
overall model predicted 41.3% variance in errors of commission [F (5, 88) = 12.40, p < .01, R2 =
41.30%]. All predictors were significant except NGRT (β = -.09, t = -0.821, p = .41, R2 = 0.50%)
and the Threat by Group interaction term (β = .21, t = 1.27, p = .21, R2 = 1.17%). GRT was the
strongest predictor of errors of commission (β = -.50, t = -4.98, p < .01, R2 = 17.72%), suggesting
that errors of commission increased as GRT decreased. Errors of omission was also a robust
predictor of errors of commission (β = .29, t = 3.13, p < .01, R2 = 7.02%), suggesting that errors
of commission increased as errors of omission increased. Next, Group, neutral errors of
omission, and neutral GRT were regressed onto contamination errors of commission. Consistent
with previous analyses, Group was not a significant predictor but neutral errors of omission and
GRT both remained significant predictors of neutral errors of commission, with neutral GRT
explaining 19.54% variance in neutral errors of commission (see Table 9). Finally, Group,
contamination errors of omission, and contamination GRT were regressed onto contamination
errors of commission. Also consistent with previous results, Group, contamination errors of
omission, and contamination GRT were all significant predictors of contamination errors of
commission. Contamination GRT explained 33.30% variance in contamination errors of
commission, making it the strongest predictor. Taken as a whole, regression analyses show a
strong and clear relation between GRT and errors of commission.
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V. DISCUSSION
A. Summary and Conclusions
Basic experimental research has shown that emotional arousal and the processing of
emotional information can significantly interfere with response inhibition. To the author’s
knowledge, the present study was the first to test how the processing of emotional information
interferes with response inhibition within a clinically relevant sample. The present study tested
how the processing of emotionally arousing and symptom relevant pictorial information –
contamination-threat images – interfered with action restraint among an analogue sample of
obsessive-compulsive participants with elevated contamination fears. This sample was
particularly relevant to the questions at hand given the large body of experimental
psychopathology research that suggests obsessions and compulsions are caused and maintained
by failures of response inhibition.
In concert with the findings of De Houwer and Tibboel (2010), the present study clearly
showed that the presentation of emotionally arousing information prior to no-go-signals resulted
in a large attenuation of action restraint. The first null hypothesis stated that there would be no
effect of Threat on action restraint (Contamination errors of commission = Neutral errors of
commission). The present findings, therefore, allow for the rejection of the first null hypothesis.
The second null hypothesis states that there would be no effect of Group on action restraint (LCP
errors of commission = HCP errors of commission). In contrast to a majority of the published
literature, the present study failed to detect a statistically significant difference in action restraint
between HCP and LCP participants. This was evidenced by no meaningful between group
difference in neutral errors of commission and no main effect of group on errors of commission.
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The third null hypothesis stated that the effect of Threat on action restraint would not differ
between LCP and HCP participants. The proportion of errors of commission almost doubled for
HCP participants but only increased by approximately 50% for LCP participants. These findings,
therefore, allow for the rejection of the third null hypothesis.
Secondary analyses were only partially in accord with previous research (De Houwer &
Tibboel, 2010). There was an effect of Threat on NGRT and errors of omission but not GRT.
Despite this, exploratory analyses repeatedly showed that GRT was the most robust predictor of
errors of commission. The final regression analysis provided the strongest exemplar of this
effect, with contamination GRT predicting over 30% variance in contamination errors of
commission. These results strongly support the attentional account of the interference effect of
Threat on action restraint but also suggest that attention plays a role in basic action restraint (i.e.,
neutral errors of commission). As GRT increased, proportion of errors of commission markedly
decreased. Whether by strategy or individual differences in abilities, longer latencies on go trials
were highly related to lower rates of errors of commission on no-go trials.
B. Implications
Inhibition does not occur in a vacuum (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Pessoa et al., 2012;
Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007). This is an incredibly important point when considering
clinical implications of the present study. In the case of OCD, inhibition is needed and often fails
during moments that are fraught with emotional information. Obsessions and compulsions occur
in phobic contexts. Interoceptive and exteroceptive emotional factors arise in such contexts and,
as such, can negatively affect inhibitory performance. Intrusive thoughts beget more intrusive
thoughts. The emotional salience motivates further intrusions but also hampers attempts to
suppress. Intrusive thoughts may even enter into consciousness more easily or occupy more
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attention as a consequence of emotional factors, which attenuate inhibitory functions and may
thus increase the probability that intrusions can intrude. Compulsions, much the same, are
motivated by emotionally arousing information in the environment and resultant interoceptive
emotional factors. Motivations for compulsion increase the potency of the prepotent response but
may also interfere with the ability to restrain from engaging in habitual acts or stop them
prematurely. These ideas can be best described with a case example and simple metaphor.
Lisa (not the real name of a patient) evinces what many would consider classic
contamination obsessions and washing compulsions. She has strong aversions toward dirt,
germs, and illness. Whenever she comes into contact with real or perceived contaminants, she
plays back mental imagery of the contaminated stimuli and scenery, much like a movie reel. This
leads to catastrophic thoughts about the implications of her contact with said contaminant. These
obsessions, in concert with affective arousal, then motivate the initiation of washing
compulsions. Lisa’s washing compulsions are not simply brief one time acts, like a key press;
they recur both within and between individual acts. Lisa’s compulsions are provoked with
relative ease, occur frequently, are more powerful than “normal” but comparable behaviors, and
are protracted once initiated. Lisa’s initiates washing behaviors dozens of times per day and she
vigorously washes, sometimes for hours at a time.
From a purely motivational perspective, Lisa’s obsessions and compulsions are caused
and maintained by environmental and individual “go” factors. Contaminants in the environment
motivate thoughts and emotions, which in turn motivate multiple response systems. This is,
essentially, a basic summary of widely accepted cognitive-behavioral perspectives on obsessions
and compulsions (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985) and, more specifically, contamination
obsessions and washing compulsions (Rachman, 2006). This perspective is accurate but
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incomplete. It is akin to claiming that the acceleration system is the only system of importance
on an automobile.
Automobiles do not just go, they stop and go. Even the most powerful automobile can be
restrained and stopped. Functional emergency brakes can keep high power automobiles from
moving and, with well-maintained brakes, an automobile can be stopped on a dime. The
motivationalist perspective is focused on mechanisms that motivate going (e.g., emotions,
beliefs, environmental factors, etc.). Much like the acceleration system of an automobile, there
are dozens of psychological mechanisms working in concert to make obsessions and
compulsions go. There are a host of additional psychological mechanisms that govern thoughts
and behaviors. Inhibitory mechanisms (resistance to interference, action restraint, action
cancellation, etc.) are the braking system of the human machine and, in the case of OCD, they
may be faulty. To take this metaphor toward its limit, Lisa might be analogous to a Mustang with
bicycle brakes, brakes that are hampered by the very same factors that improve acceleration. Said
otherwise, Lisa’s faulty or inadequate inhibitory capacities are even less effective at restraining
or stopping obsessions and compulsions when greased by emotional factors.
C. Limitations and Future Directions
The present study highlights the importance of inhibition within the emotional context.
The present study was, however, cross sectional. Some inhibitory models of OCD focus not just
on the importance of inhibition in the maintenance of obsession and compulsions but also on the
role of inhibition in the pathogenesis of obsessions and compulsions (Rosenberg & Keshavan,
1998). Compulsive tendencies are relatively common among children and inhibition is thought to
be crucial in the extinction of maladaptive, repetitive habits. Given that inhibitory functions are
highly heritable in the general population (Friedman et al., 2008) and within OCD probands
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(Lennertz et al., 2012; Menzies et al., 2007), it is plausible that inadequate inhibitory functions
play a role in the development of compulsions, and perhaps – although less tenable – obsessions.
As outlined by Roseberg and Keshavan (1998), repetitive behaviors may persist for longer
periods of time due to delayed or incomplete development of inhibitory functions among
children at risk of developing OCD. The present study cannot speak to this developmental
psychopathological model. Perhaps children at risk of developing OCD are also anxious-neurotic
or evidence attentional biases toward threatening information. As seen in the present study and
previous research, these factors could further impair inhibitory functioning, thus potentiating risk
of repetitive habits developing into clinically significant compulsions. This idea could be tested
by administering a similar protocol as the present one – or better yet, a more generalist paradigm
such as the white-noise based emotional stop-signal employed by Pessoa and colleagues (2012) –
to children at risk for developing OCD (e.g., children with chronic tics or children whose parents
are diagnosed with OCD). Simple between-group differences in emotional interference of
response inhibition would suggest a more precise vulnerability than basic inhibitory deficits.
The interference effect of contamination images and, for that matter, neutral images, may
have tapped into another neurocognitive function other than attention and response inhibition;
namely, resistance to distractor interference. This is not to say that attention was not implicated,
but rather attention was mediated by other executive function(s). This interpretation of the data is
in keeping with the operational definition of the construct of resistance to distractor interference
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004) and previous research showing that response inhibition is related to
resistance to interference. Previous research has already shown that symptom-specific distractor
stimuli interfere with basic interference tasks – such as the emotional Stroop – among
participants diagnosed with OCD and analogue OC samples (Moritz et al., 2008; Rao, Arasappa,
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Reddy, Venkatasubramanian, & Reddy, 2010; Tobon, Ouimet, & Dozois, 2011; Unoki, Kasuga,
Matsushima, Ohta, & Doi, 2000; Wyble, Sharma, & Bowman, 2008). If the present findings are
tapping resistance to distractor interference, then the interpretation of the data would be quite
different. The lateral orbitofrontal loop is thought to be integral to the pathogenesis and
maintenance of OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2005; Graybiel & Rauch, 2000). Within this loop, the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and orbital frontal cortex (OFC) are both broadly implicated in
the processing of valenced information and inhibitory functions (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000),
particularly in OCD. The ACC, however, is likely the primary mediator of resistance to
distractor interference (Bush et al., 1998; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Whalen et al., 1998)
whereas the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) is largely responsible for prepotent response inhibition
(Eagle et al., 2008; Eagle, Bari, & Robbins, 2008; Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff,
2003; Rubia et al., 2005). Although there are no data to directly speak to this, the emotional
go/no-go task is likely mediated by multiple neural mechanisms. More specifically, it is possible
that response inhibition is mediated by OFC activity and resistant to emotional interference is
mediated by ACC activity.
The absence of the Group effect was unexpected and is somewhat odd given the strength
of the Threat by Group interaction effect. The simplest explanation for this finding is that an
analogue OCD sample was used instead of a diagnosed sample. HCP participants all scored
above the clinical cut-off score identified by Abramowitz and colleagues (2010) and, as a group,
HCP participants actually scored higher than the clinical sample reported by Abramowitz and
colleagues. At first blush, this would imply that a majority of participants (approximately 75%
given specificity of the DOCS) would likely meet DSM diagnostic criteria for OCD. However,
Abramowitz and colleagues did not publish false positive rates when using a DOCS-Total cut-off

37

score of 18. Given the author’s experience with previous research using similar cut-off scores
and high rates of false-positive with other self-report assessment tools (Flament et al., 1988) it is
possible, if not likely, that a large portion of HCP participants in the present study would not
meet diagnostic criteria for OCD if properly assessed. It would be, therefore, advisable for the
present study to be replicated with a sample diagnosed with OCD. A clinical or diagnosed
community sample may evidence based deficits in response inhibition – which were not
observed in the present data – which would allow for a better test of the interaction of inhibition
and emotion. Another possible explanation for the absence of a Group effect may lie in the
assessment tool that was used in the present study. The emotional go/no-go used in the present
study had a time pressure (responses were required within 400 ms), which may have artificially
cut off errors of commission that escaped restraint after 400 ms. This is, however, an unlikely
explanation as average GRT and NGRT were well below 400 ms. The go/no-go is also an easier
task than other measures of response inhibition (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Perhaps Group
effects would have been more evident if a more difficult task were used, such as the emotional
stop-signal tasks used by Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007) or Pessoa and colleagues (2012).
The sample size used in the present study is too small to draw decisive conclusions.
There was also a lack of a non-OCD anxious control group. It is possible that the present
findings are due to general anxiety and not OC symptoms. HCP participants scored much higher
on the GAD-7 than LCP participants. However, GAD-7 scores showed almost no relations to
errors of commission or omission. This is in keeping with previous response inhibition research
that showed no meaningful relation between a measure of trait anxiety and neutral and emotional
response inhibition (Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & Eysenck, 2009). Nonetheless, larger
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samples that include anxious controls should be recruited for any future replications and
extensions.
Previous literature has suggested that inhibitory deficits in OCD may be due in part to
comorbid symptoms of depression (Aycicegi et al., 2003; Moritz et al., 2001). Unfortunately,
neither continuous nor categorical assessment tools for depression were used in the present
study. It is, therefore, difficult to say what, if any, role depression played in the present findings.
There are several other psychiatric disorders that are also thought to be affected by failures of
inhibition. Due to the lack of diagnostic assessments and lack of overly restrictive study
inclusion criteria (e.g., only allow participants diagnosed with OCD and no other psychiatric
condition), the available data cannot comprehensively speak to the degree to which symptoms of
other disorders did or did not affect the present findings. The absence of any meaningful
correlations between GAD-7 scores and errors of commission does, nonetheless, suggest that the
observed findings are not a simple artifact of anxiety. Given the present data, it is therefore
unlikely that the primary findings could be explained by any possible anxious comorbidity.
As has been mentioned throughout this manuscript, response inhibition is implicated in
both the pathogenesis and maintenance of OCD. Very little research has directly focused on the
importance of response inhibition in the treatment of OCD. However, there is a convincing
literature that highlights the importance of response prevention during exposure therapy for OCD
[known as exposure and response prevention (ERP)] (Abramowitz, 1996; Foa & Goldstein,
1978). In most cases, response prevention involves action restraint. For example, contact is made
with a contaminant during exposure exercises and then the patient is implored to resist engaging
in any compensatory compulsive behaviors. The present study suggests that failures of response
prevention may be exacerbated by emotionally salient stimulus characteristics. Given this
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possible link between response prevention and emotional action restraint, future research might
focus on how response inhibition and, more specifically, emotional response inhibition, predicts
treatment compliance and treatment outcome.
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Footnotes
1

While DSM-IV-TR and all previous versions of the DSM categorized OCD as an

anxiety disorder, OCD will soon be removed from the “Anxiety Disorders” category and placed
within a new category labeled “Obsessions Compulsive and Related Disorders” (OCRD; APA,
2013). The OCRD category of mental disorders will include OCD, hoarding disorder, body
dysmorphic disorder, trichotillomania, and the new excoriation (skin picking) disorder. Despite
efforts to increase transparency during preparation of DSM-V, the final rationale behind the
decision to create OCRD still remains unclear and is controversial. There will, therefore, be no
further treatment of this issue within the present manuscript.
2

Inhibition is defined as a mechanism or process, while interference is an effect.

Therefore, the term resistance to interference is used to clarify that a process (resistance) and not
an affect (interference) is being discussed (MacLeod, 2003; Friedman & Miyake, 2004).
3

The emotional Stroop task has been administered to samples diagnosed with OCD in a

large number of published studies. However, the findings from these studies are usually
interpreted as evidence (or lack thereof) of an attentional bias. This interpretation of the
emotional Stroop effect is controversial and quite possibly inaccurate (Bush, Luu, & Posner,
2000; Whalen et al., 1998). Therefore, published papers with attentional interpretations of
emotional Stroop paradigms will not be reviewed herein.
4

Primary hypotheses were also tested using mixed factor ANOVA. Effects were similar

to those derived from MLM. The only differences being a slightly lesser Threat by Group effect
and slightly larger main effects of Threat and Group.
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Table 1. Descriptive data for low contamination phobic (LCP) and high
contamination phobic (HCP) participants.
LCP (M, SD)

HCP (M, SD)

F or Χ2

DOCS-Total

6.47 (.72)

30.65 (8.70)

172.06b

DOCS-C

1.53 (.18)

9.47 (2.32)

2.65.88b

DOCS-R

1.97 (.31)

8.12 (2.87)

85.24b

DOCS-O

1.74 (.32)

7.12 (2.62)

71.63b

DOCS-S

1.41 (.26)

5.94 (4.41)

29.38b

GAD-7

2.77 (1.83)

6.47 (3.62)

21.78b

Age

19.07 (.94)

19.65 (2.32)

.23

Gender

67% Female

59% Female

.29

Race

83% Caucasian

82% Caucasian

1.99

Note. Superscript “a” denotes p ≤ .05 and superscript “b” denotes p ≤ .01
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics [M (SD)] from main effects and interaction of Threat (neutral and
contamination) and Group (LCP and HCP) on errors of commission. All values are percentages
of errors of commission relative to total number of commission trials (nerrors/nno-go trials)
Threat

Group
LCP

HCP

Neutral

10.30 (1.62)

11.04 (2.15)

Contamination

14.80 (1.75)

20.78 (2.32)
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics [M (SD)] from main effects and interaction of Threat (neutral and
contamination) and Group (LCP and HCP) on errors of omission. All values are percentages of
errors of omission relative to total number of omission trials (nerrors/ngo trials)
Threat

Group
LCP

HCP

Neutral

23.09 (1.89)

21.08 (2.51)

Contamination

26.64 (2.11)

25.66 (2.80)
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics [M (SD)] from main effects and interaction of Threat (neutral and
contamination) and Group (LCP and HCP) on no-go reaction time (NGRT). All values are in
milliseconds.
Threat

Group
LCP

HCP

Neutral

288.14 (4.73)

296.26 (5.83)

Contamination

305.91 (4.73)

301.13 (6.29)

Note. NGRT values were available for all 17 HCP participants for both
neutral and contamination no-go trials. Contamination no-go NGRT values
were available for all 30 LCP participants but only 27 neutral no-go NGRT
values were available for LCP participants due to 3 participants.

56

Table 5. Descriptive statistics [M (SD)] from main effects and interaction of Threat (neutral and
contamination) and Group (LCP and HCP) on correct reaction time (GRT). All values are in
milliseconds.
Threat

Group
LCP

HCP

Neutral

338.18 (2.38)

342.10 (3.16)

Contamination

339.18 (2.74)

340.98 (3.63)
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Table 6. Pearson’s correlation coefficients within entire sample
DOCS
Total
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DOCS
Cont.
DOCS
Resp.
DOCS
Obsess
DOCS
Symm.
GAD7
Total
Neu.
Comm.
Cont.
Comm.
Neu.
Omm.
Cont.
Omm.
Neu.
NGRT
Cont.
NGRT
Neu.
GRT
Cont.
GRT

DOCS
Cont.

DOCS
Resp.

DOCS
Obsess

DOCS
Symm.

GAD7
Total

Neu.
Comm
.

Cont.
Comm
.

Neu.
Omm.

Cont.
Omm.

Neu.
NGRT

Cont.
NGRT

Neu.
GRT

.94b
.91b

.88b

.89b

.83b

.73b

.80b

.62b

.63b

.62b

.69b

.64b

.71b

.58b

.49b

-.08

-.00

-.10

.03

-.19

.01

.16

.25*

.11

.23

-.05

.18

.57b

-.00

-.01

.09

-.01

-.08

-.00

.31a

.04

.01

-.03

.11

-.03

-.03

.13

.28a

-.04

.71b

.21

.15

.23

.05

.30a

.11

-.11

-.25

.32a

.42b

.06

-.05

.06

.06

.17

.18

-.16

-.36b

.16

.37b

.39b

.23

.15

.15

.18

.35a

.21

-.38b

-.36b

.15

.12

.26*

.39b

.20

.07

.23

.08

.33a

.15

-.45b

-.53b

.21

.40b

.47b

.68b

Note. Superscript “a” denotes p ≤ .05, superscript “b” denotes p ≤ .01, and “*” denotes p ≤ .10.

.65b

Table 7. Pearson’s correlation coefficients split by LCP (upper diagonal) and HCP (lower diagonal)

59

DOCS
Total
DOCS
Cont.
DOCS
Resp.
DOCS
Obsess
DOCS
Symm.
GAD7
Total
Neu.
Comm.
Cont.
Comm.
Neu.
Omm.
Cont.
Omm.
Neu.
NGRT
Cont.
NGRT
Neu.
GRT
Cont.
GRT

DOCS
Total

DOCS
Cont.

DOCS
Resp.

DOCS
Obsess

DOCS
Symm.

GAD7
Total

Neu.
Comm.

Cont.
Comm.

Neu.
Omm.

Cont.
Omm.

Neu.
NGRT

Cont.
NGRT

Neu.
GRT

Cont.
GRT

-

.71b

.68b

.63b

.68b

.49b

-.17

-.18

-.01

-.11

-.11

.04

.10

.19

.67b

-

.35*

.40a

.35*

.22

-.11

-.14

-.03

-.12

-.05

-.02

.06

.14

.65b

.67b

-

.06

.38a

.56b

-.10

-.09

.11

.06

-.03

.02

.02

.17

.73b

.48b

.41

-

.17

.24

.03

.04

-.20

-.21

-.38*

.08

-.09

-.05

.70b

.07

.23

.33

-

.25

-.30

-.35*

.13

-.04

.21

-.01

.33*

.28

.46*

.42*

.49a

.29

.21

-

.03

.01

.06

.10

-.31

.26

.11

.22

-.37

-.13

-.41

-.06

-.36

-.06

-

.62b

.42a

.43a

.07

.02

-.42a

-.32*

-.31

.05

.37

-.02

-.37

.04

.51b

-

.15

.08

-.01

-.26

-.54b

-.50b

.39

.44*

.53a

.53a

-.13

.07

.06

-.10

-

.75b

.39a

.22

.26

.28

.37

.21

.59a

.38

.01

.37

-.12

-.31

.61b

-

.37*

.35*

.19

.37

.49a

.19

.49a

.26

.40

.37

-.47*

-.46*

.23

.61b

-

.30

.31

.38a

.59a

.16

.47*

.38

.54a

.34

-.53a

-.54a

.02

.42*

.64b

-

.42a

.66b

.41*

.06

.10

.41*

.46*

.23

-.31

-.17

-.06

-.08

.12

.36

-

.74b

.52a

.06

.52a

.22

.52a

.12

-.71b

-.67b

.12

.51a

.63b

.75b

.51a

-

Note. Superscript “a” denotes p ≤ .05, superscript “b” denotes p ≤ .01, and “*” denotes p ≤ .10.

Table 8. Threat, Group, Threat by Group, errors of omission, GRT, and NGRT regressed onto
errors of commission.
Predictor

Std. β

t

R2∆

Threat

-.43

-3.04b

6.60

Group

-.32

-2.78b

5.15

Threat by Group

.21

1.27

1.16

Omission

.29

3.13

7.02

GRT

-.50

-4.98

17.72

NGRT

-.09

-0.82

0.00

Note. Superscript “b” denotes p ≤ .01
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Table 9. Group, errors of omission, and GRT, and regressed onto neutral errors of commission
and contamination errors of commission
DV

Predictor

Std. β

t

R2∆

Group

-.14

-1.09

01.93

Omission

.39b

2.99

14.59

GRT

-.45b

-3.45

19.54

Group

-.32b

-2.74

10.18

Omission

.23*

1.78

4.33

GRT

-.63a

-4.95

33.30

Neutral Errors of
Comission

Contamination
Errors of
Comission

Note. Superscript “a” denotes p ≤ .05, superscript “b”
denotes p ≤ .01, and “*” denotes p ≤ .10.
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Figure 1. Modern nested hierarchical heuristic of executive inhibition. The two higher order
constructs of response inhibition and resistance to interference can be further separated based on
the temporal properties of resistance or inhibition. Exemplar tasks are displayed in square boxes
and reciprocal arrows are included to indicate possible shared variance among tasks.
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Figure 2. Pictorial display of the emotional go/no
go/no-go
go task used in the present study.

Note. For the sake of illustration, § is a stop-signal for the neutral trials and a go--signal for the
contamination trials. In the actual experiment, each symbol was used as the go or stop-signal
stop
for
all conditions.
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Figure 3. Main effects and interaction of Threat (neutral and contamination) and Group (LCP
andd HCP) on errors of commission.

25

% Errors of Commission

20

15
LCP
HCP

10

5

0
Neutral

Contamination

Note. LCP denotes “Low Contamination Phobic” and HCP denotes “High Contamination
Phobic”. Errors of commission are presented as whole percentage of trials.
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Appendix A
Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale (DOCS)
Instructions: This questionnaire asks you about 4 different categories of concerns that you might
or might not experience. For each category there is a description of the kinds of thoughts
(sometimes called obsessions) and behaviors (sometimes called compulsions) that are typical of
that particular concern, followed by five questions about your experiences with these thoughts
and behaviors. Please read each description carefully and answer the questions for each category
based on your experiences in the last month.
Category 1: Concerns about Germs and Contamination
Examples…
-Thoughts or feelings that you are contaminated because you came into contact with (or were
nearby) a certain object or person.
-The feeling of being contaminated because you were in a certain place (such as a bathroom).
-Thoughts about germs, sickness, or the possibility of spreading contamination.
-Washing your hands, using hand sanitizer gels, showering, changing your clothes, or cleaning
objects because of concerns about contamination.
-Following a certain routine (e.g., in the bathroom, getting dressed) because of contamination
-Avoiding certain people, objects, or places because of contamination.

The next questions ask about your experiences with thoughts and behaviors related to
contamination over the last month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be different than
the examples listed above. Also, if any of the items concern something that was not part of your
experience in the last month, answer on the basis of how you think you might feel if you had
such an experience. Otherwise, answer all items on the basis of your own experience. Please
circle the number next to your answer:
1.

About how much time have you spent each day thinking about contamination and
engaging in washing or cleaning behaviors because of contamination?
0
1
2
3
4

None at all
Less than 1 hour each day
Between 1 and 3 hours each day
Between 3 and 8 hours each day
8 hours or more each day

Continued 
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2.

To what extent have you avoided situations in order to prevent concerns with
contamination or having to spend time washing, cleaning, or showering?
0
1
2
3
4

3.

4.

If you had thoughts about contamination but could not wash, clean, or shower (or
otherwise remove the contamination), how distressed or anxious did you become?
0
Not at all distressed/anxious
1
Mildly distressed/anxious
2
Moderately distressed/anxious
3
Severely distressed/anxious
4
Extremely distressed/anxious
To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been disrupted
by contamination concerns and excessive washing, showering, cleaning, or avoidance
behaviors?
0
1
2
3
4

5.

None at all
A little avoidance
A moderate amount of avoidance
A great deal of avoidance
Extreme avoidance of nearly all things

No disruption at all.
A little disruption, but I mostly function well.
Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage.
My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing.
My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all.

How difficult is it for you to disregard thoughts about contamination and refrain from
behaviors such as washing, showering, cleaning, and other decontamination routines
when you try to do so?
0
1
2
3
4

Not at all difficult
A little difficult
Moderately difficult
Very difficult
Extremely difficult

Continued 

66

Category 2: Concerns about being Responsible for Harm, Injury, or Bad Luck
Examples…
-A doubt that you might have made a mistake that could cause something awful or harmful to
happen.
-The thought that a terrible accident, disaster, injury, or other bad luck might have occurred and
you weren’t careful enough to prevent it.
-The thought that you could prevent harm or bad luck by doing things in a certain way, counting
to certain numbers, or by avoiding certain “bad” numbers or words.
-Thought of losing something important that you are unlikely to lose (e.g., wallet, identify theft,
papers).
-Checking things such as locks, switches, your wallet, etc. more often than is necessary.
-Repeatedly asking or checking for reassurance that something bad did not (or will not) happen.
-Mentally reviewing past events to make sure you didn’t do anything wrong.
-The need to follow a special routine because it will prevent harm or disasters from occurring.
-The need to count to certain numbers, or avoid certain bad numbers, due to the fear of harm.

The next questions ask about your experiences with thoughts and behaviors related to harm and
disasters over the last month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be slightly different than
the examples listed above. Please circle the number next to your answer:
1.

About how much time have you spent each day thinking about the possibility of harm or
disasters and engaging in checking or efforts to get reassurance that such things do not
(or did not) occur?
0
1
2
3
4

2.

None at all
Less than 1 hour each day
Between 1 and 3 hours each day
Between 3 and 8 hours each day
8 hours or more each day

To what extent have you avoided situations so that you did not have to check for danger
or worry about possible harm or disasters?
0
1
2
3
4

None at all
A little avoidance
A moderate amount of avoidance
A great deal of avoidance
Extreme avoidance of nearly all things

Continued 
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3.

When you think about the possibility of harm or disasters, or if you cannot check or get
reassurance about these things, how distressed or anxious did you become?
0
1
2
3
4

4.

To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been disrupted
by thoughts about harm or disasters and excessive checking or asking for reassurance?
0
1
2
3
4

5.

Not at all distressed/anxious
Mildly distressed/anxious
Moderately distressed/anxious
Severely distressed/anxious
Extremely distressed/anxious

No disruption at all.
A little disruption, but I mostly function well.
Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage.
My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing.
My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all.

How difficult is it for you to disregard thoughts about possible harm or disasters and
refrain from checking or reassurance-seeking behaviors when you try to do so?
0
1
2
3
4

Not at all difficult
A little difficult
Moderately difficult
Very difficult
Extremely difficult

Category 3: Unacceptable Thoughts
Examples…
-Unpleasant thoughts about sex, immorality, or violence that come to mind against your will.
-Thoughts about doing awful, improper, or embarrassing things that you don’t really want to do.
-Repeating an action or following a special routine because of a bad thought.
-Mentally performing an action or saying prayers to get rid of an unwanted or unpleasant
thought.
-Avoidance of certain people, places, situations or other triggers of unwanted or unpleasant
thoughts

Continued 
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The next questions ask about your experiences with unwanted thoughts that come to mind
against your will and behaviors designed to deal with these kinds of thoughts over the last
month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be slightly different than the examples listed
above. Please circle the number next to your answer:
1.

About how much time have you spent each day with unwanted unpleasant thoughts and
with behavioral or mental actions to deal with them?
0
1
2
3
4

2.

To what extent have you been avoiding situations, places, objects and other reminders
(e.g., numbers, people) that trigger unwanted or unpleasant thoughts?
0
1
2
3
4

3.

Not at all distressed/anxious
Mildly distressed/anxious
Moderately distressed/anxious
Severely distressed/anxious
Extremely distressed/anxious

To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been disrupted
by unwanted and unpleasant thoughts and efforts to avoid or deal with such thoughts?
0
1
2
3
4

5.

None at all
A little avoidance
A moderate amount of avoidance
A great deal of avoidance
Extreme avoidance of nearly all things

When unwanted or unpleasant thoughts come to mind against your will how distressed or
anxious did you become?
0
1
2
3
4

4.

None at all
Less than 1 hour each day
Between 1 and 3 hours each day
Between 3 and 8 hours each day
8 hours or more each day

No disruption at all.
A little disruption, but I mostly function well.
Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage.
My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing.
My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all.

How difficult is it for you to disregard unwanted or unpleasant thoughts and refrain from
using behavioral or mental acts to deal with them when you try to do so?
0
1
2
3
4

Not at all difficult
A little difficult
Moderately difficult
Very difficult
Extremely difficult
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Category 4: Concerns about Symmetry, Completeness, and the Need for Things to be
“Just Right”
Examples…
-The need for symmetry, evenness, balance, or exactness.
-Feelings that something isn’t “just right.”
-Repeating a routine action until it feels “just right” or “balanced.”
-Counting senseless things (e.g., ceiling tiles, words in a sentence).
-Unnecessarily arranging things in “order.”
-Having to say something over and over in the same way until it feels “just right.”

The next questions ask about your experiences with feelings that something is not “just right”
and behaviors designed to achieve order, symmetry, or balance over the last month. Keep in
mind that your experiences might be slightly different than the examples listed above. Please
circle the number next to your answer:
1.

About how much time have you spent each day with unwanted thoughts about symmetry,
order, or balance and with behaviors intended to achieve symmetry, order or balance?
0
1
2
3
4

2.

To what extent have you been avoiding situations, places or objects associated with
feelings that something is not symmetrical or “just right?”
0
1
2
3
4

3.

None at all
Less than 1 hour each day
Between 1 and 3 hours each day
Between 3 and 8 hours each day
8 hours or more each day

None at all
A little avoidance
A moderate amount of avoidance
A great deal of avoidance
Extreme avoidance of nearly all things

When you have the feeling of something being “not just right,” how distressed or anxious
did you become?
0
1
2
3
4

Not at all distressed/anxious
Mildly distressed/anxious
Moderately distressed/anxious
Severely distressed/anxious
Extremely distressed/anxious

Continued 
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4.

To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been disrupted
by the feeling of things being “not just right,” and efforts to put things in order or make
them feel right?
0
1
2
3
4

5.

No disruption at all.
A little disruption, but I mostly function well.
Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage.
My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing.
My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all.

How difficult is it for you to disregard thoughts about the lack of symmetry and order,
and refrain from urges to arrange things in order or repeat certain behaviors when you try
to do so?
0
1
2
3
4

Not at all difficult
A little difficult
Moderately difficult
Very difficult
Extremely difficult
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Appendix B
Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7)
INSTRUCTIONS: Over the last 2 weeks, how often have
you been bothered by the following problems?
Please use the following scale:
0 = not at all
1 = several days
2 = more than ½ the days
3 = nearly every day
1 Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge

0

1

2

3

2 Not being able to stop or control worrying

0

1

2

3

3 Worrying too much about different things

0

1

2

3

4 Having trouble relaxing

0

1

2

3

5 Being so restless that it is hard to sit still

0

1

2

3

6 Becoming easily annoyed or irritable

0

1

2

3

7 Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen

0

1

2

3
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Appendix C
******************************************************************************
Errors of Commission
******************************************************************************
***Baseline (null) MLM on commission***
mixed commission
/fixed intercept | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (OVERALL)
/method ML.
***Threat as fixed and repeated effects***
mixed commission by threat
/fixed intercept threat | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.
***Threat and Group as fixed effects and Threat as repeated effect***
mixed commission by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.
***Threat, Group, and their interaction term as fixed effects with Threat as repeated effect***
mixed commission by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group threat*group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat)
/EMMEANS TABLES (group)
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat*group)
/method ML.
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the below syntax results in an estimate in the interaction effect that reflects the overall difference
between HCP/Contamination and all other means
******************************************************************************
mixed commission by threat_1 group_1
/fixed intercept threat_1 group_1 threat_1*group_1 | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat_1 | subject(id)
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat_1)
/EMMEANS TABLES (group_1)
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat_1*group_1)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.
******************************************************************************
Errors of Omission
******************************************************************************
***Baseline (null) model MLM on omission***
mixed omission
/fixed intercept | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (OVERALL)
/method ML.
***Threat as fixed and repeated effect***
mixed omission by threat
/fixed intercept threat | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.

***Threat and Group as fixed effects and Threat as repeated effect***
mixed omission by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group | SSTYPE (3)
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/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.
***Threat, Group, and their interaction term as fixed effects with Threat as repeated effect***
mixed omission by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group threat*group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat)
/EMMEANS TABLES (group)
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat*group)
/method ML.
******************************************************************************
NGRT
******************************************************************************
***Baseline (null) model MLM on NGRT***
mixed NGRT
/fixed intercept | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (OVERALL)
/method ML.
***Threat as fixed and repeated effect***
mixed NGRT by threat
/fixed intercept threat | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.

***Threat and Group as fixed effects and Threat as repeated effect***
mixed NGRT by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
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/print solution testcov
/method ML.
***Threat, Group, and their interaction term as fixed effects with Threat as repeated effect***
mixed NGRT by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group threat*group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat)
/EMMEANS TABLES (group)
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat*group)
/method ML.
******************************************************************************
GRT
******************************************************************************
***Baseline (null) model MLM on GRT***
mixed GRT
/fixed intercept | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (OVERALL)
/method ML.
***Threat as fixed and repeated effect***
mixed GRT by threat
/fixed intercept threat | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.

***Group as fixed effects ***
mixed GRT by group
/fixed intercept group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.
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***Threat and Group as fixed effects and Threat as repeated effect***
mixed GRT by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/method ML.
***Threat, Group, and their interaction term as fixed effects with Threat as repeated effect***
mixed GRT by threat group
/fixed intercept threat group threat*group | SSTYPE (3)
/random intercept | subject(id)
/repeated threat | subject (id)
/print solution testcov
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat)
/EMMEANS TABLES (group)
/EMMEANS TABLES (threat*group)
/method ML.
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Appendix D
id,threat,group,commission,omission,NGRT,GRT,threat_1,group_1
1,1,1,6.25,16.67,277.75,341.36,0,0
1,0,1,31.25,20.83,315.35,335.53,1,0
2,1,1,8.33,39.58,315,324.66,0,0
2,0,1,17.39,23.4,264.74,319.67,1,0
3,1,1,10.42,25,295.5,349.13,0,0
3,0,1,14.58,41.67,339,348.12,1,0
4,1,1,6.25,31.25,286.5,340.13,0,0
4,0,1,29.17,25,277.98,335.72,1,0
5,1,1,6.25,25,302,348.16,0,0
5,0,1,10.42,16.67,342.25,356.22,1,0
6,1,1,22.92,14.58,282.29,328.6,0,0
6,0,1,37.5,14.58,281.5,313.62,1,0
7,1,1,4.17,14.58,288,355.46,0,0
7,0,1,2.08,6.25,315,347.87,1,0
9,1,1,12.5,14.58,323.13,339.93,0,0
9,0,1,6.25,25,328.5,345.85,1,0
10,1,1,8.33,10.42,297.67,328.27,0,0
10,0,1,8.33,12.5,284,322.35,1,0
11,1,1,25,43.75,295.25,346.79,0,0
11,0,1,15.22,41.67,317,338.51,1,0
12,1,1,18.75,12.5,277.75,307.55,0,0
12,0,1,22.92,27.08,293.82,331.74,1,0
13,1,1,2.08,12.5,309,336.9,0,0
13,0,1,4.17,8.33,314.5,334.08,1,0
14,1,1,2.08,29.17,314,353.71,0,0
14,0,1,8.33,47.92,349.17,360.54,1,0
15,1,1,12.5,10.42,284.75,318.18,0,0
15,0,1,16.67,12.5,303.84,334.74,1,0
16,1,1,0,16.67,,338.55,0,0
16,0,1,16.67,12.5,245.79,330.1,1,0
17,1,1,25.53,21.28,266.49,316.34,0,0
17,0,1,25,36.17,244.92,307.32,1,0
18,1,1,14.58,33.33,302.43,349.2,0,0
18,0,1,14.58,39.58,342.54,356.22,1,0
19,1,1,35.42,41.67,283.22,321.07,0,0
19,0,1,29.79,35.42,314.71,323.73,1,0
20,1,1,8.33,16.67,292.17,330.73,0,0
20,0,1,18.75,20.83,294.32,354.24,1,0
21,1,1,0,25,,358.65,0,0
21,0,1,4.17,33.33,279,350.8,1,0
22,1,1,4.17,18.75,273,350.04,0,0
22,0,1,14.58,18.75,336.75,350.17,1,0
23,1,1,6.25,22.92,307.75,328.75,0,0
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23,0,1,12.5,35.42,311.5,345.67,1,0
24,1,1,2.08,18.75,242,360.33,0,0
24,0,1,2.08,16.67,294,354.58,1,0
25,1,1,0,16.67,,339.8,0,0
25,0,1,10.64,14.58,293.75,336.75,1,0
26,1,1,4.17,4.17,274.5,336.72,0,0
26,0,1,4.17,16.67,308,324.44,1,0
27,1,1,14.58,45.83,305.5,345,0,0
27,0,1,12.5,47.92,327.3,348.32,1,0
28,1,1,8.33,35.42,323,359.33,0,0
28,0,1,2.08,43.75,314,361.95,1,0
29,1,1,2.08,12.5,201,315.54,0,0
29,0,1,16.67,16.67,302.24,322.74,1,0
32,1,0,4.17,16.67,308,342.94,0,1
32,0,0,33.33,25,317.09,345.59,1,1
33,1,0,10.42,12.5,285.5,329.06,0,1
33,0,0,35.42,14.58,274.95,311.24,1,1
34,1,0,16.67,2.08,291.8,339.55,0,1
34,0,0,25.53,20.83,306.5,345.68,1,1
35,1,0,29.17,16.67,272.9,329.93,0,1
35,0,0,27.08,12.5,266.59,300.3,1,1
30,1,1,31.25,34.04,298.22,334.3,0,0
30,0,1,31.25,45.83,322.36,347.59,1,0
37,1,0,20.83,37.5,305.25,341.26,0,1
37,0,0,29.17,45.83,313.86,341.58,1,1
38,1,0,6.25,14.58,297.5,362.95,0,1
38,0,0,25,22.92,279.19,346.05,1,1
39,1,0,8.33,27.08,295.5,334.38,0,1
39,0,0,29.17,25,308.72,336.97,1,1
40,1,0,10.42,25,324.13,364.55,0,1
40,0,0,12.5,27.08,346.3,362.34,1,1
41,1,0,4.17,33.33,308,339.95,0,1
41,0,0,8.33,36.17,331.5,351.81,1,1
42,1,0,8.51,27.08,297.5,325.35,0,1
42,0,0,12.77,35.42,296,346.95,1,1
43,1,0,2.08,10.42,267,355.05,0,1
43,0,0,10.42,12.5,320.75,348.87,1,1
44,1,0,27.08,22.92,247.04,333.54,0,1
44,0,0,31.25,16.67,252.6,316.13,1,1
31,1,1,6.25,29.17,302.75,342.17,0,0
31,0,1,4.17,41.67,319.5,355.15,1,0
45,1,0,4.17,22.92,279.5,343.09,0,1
45,0,0,16.67,22.92,280.2,351.14,1,1
46,1,0,16.67,31.25,287.27,351,0,1
46,0,0,25,31.25,277.93,337.74,1,1
47,1,0,6.25,25,342.75,326.48,0,1
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47,0,0,6.25,35.42,303,351.66,1,1
48,1,0,4.17,27.08,316,353.07,0,1
48,0,0,14.89,20.83,308.5,349.79,1,1
49,1,0,8.33,6.25,310.75,343.57,0,1
49,0,0,10.42,31.25,335.5,352.78,1,
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Appendix E
Office of Research Compliance
Institutional Review Board

March 5, 2012
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Thomas Adams
William Levine
Jeffrey Lohr

FROM:

Ro Windwalker
IRB Coordinator

RE:

New Protocol Approval

IRB Protocol #:

12-02-506

Protocol Title:

Emotion, Inhibition, and Anxiety

Review Type:
Approved Project Period:

EXEMPT

EXPEDITED

FULL IRB

Start Date: 03/04/2012 Expiration Date: 03/03/2013

Your protocol has been approved by the IRB. Protocols are approved for a maximum period of
one year. If you wish to continue the project past the approved project period (see above), you
must submit a request, using the form Continuing Review for IRB Approved Projects, prior to the
expiration date. This form is available from the IRB Coordinator or on the Research Compliance
website (http://vpred.uark.edu/210.php). As a courtesy, you will be sent a reminder two months
in advance of that date. However, failure to receive a reminder does not negate your obligation
to make the request in sufficient time for review and approval. Federal regulations prohibit
retroactive approval of continuation. Failure to receive approval to continue the project prior to
the expiration date will result in Termination of the protocol approval. The IRB Coordinator can
give you guidance on submission times.
This protocol has been approved for 200 participants. If you wish to make any modifications
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval
prior to implementing those changes. All modifications should be requested in writing (email is
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change.
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210
Administration Building, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu.
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